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The Rhetoric of Church and State 
by Frederick Mark Gedicks 
Duke University Press (1995) 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In The Rhetoric of Church and State,1 Frederick Mark Ge-
dicks attempts to weave a common thread through what has 
become, by most accounts, a “tangled web”2 of Supreme Court 
religion clause jurisprudence. Professor Gedicks states that his 
book “is generally a work of description.”3 This characteriza-
tion, however, is misleadingly modest; the book goes far beyond 
merely cataloguing the frustratingly inconsistent and, at times, 
inequitable parade of religion clause cases the Court has de-
cided in recent years. 
Although Professor Gedicks stops short of explicitly offering 
normative solutions to this problem of inconsistency,4 he fo-
cuses intensely on the theoretical underpinnings of the Court’s 
approach to the interaction between religion and the state. 
This focus leads Gedicks to the hypothesis that the confusion in 
this area of law is not simply the result of an ad hoc approach 
to religious liberty issues. Rather, it stems from a shift by the 
 
 1. FREDERICK MARK GEDICKS, THE RHETORIC OF CHURCH AND STATE (1995). 
 2. Id. at 4; see also, e.g., Thomas C. Berg, Religion Clause Anti-Theories, 72 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 693, 693 (1997) (describing the Court’s religion clause jurispru-
dence as “a mess”); Michael W. McConnell & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Ap-
proach to Issues of Religious Freedom, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 1 (1989) (describing the 
Court’s religion clause jurisprudence as “riven by contradictions and bogged down in 
slogans and metaphors”). 
 3. GEDICKS, supra note 1, at 7. 
 4. In fact, Professor Gedicks affirmatively states in his introduction, “My pur-
pose here is not to articulate and defend a particular normative vision of church-state 
relations.” Id. However, the subtext of the book seems to advocate a regime in which 
religion is allowed a more prominent role in public discourse than it is under the 
Court’s current understanding. See infra Part III. 
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Court away from a “religiously informed communitarian dis-
course,”5 in which religion, as the primary source of societal 
values, is welcome in public debate,6 toward a “secular, neutral, 
individualist discourse,”7 in which religion is viewed with sus-
picion and given no legitimate place in the public decision-
making process.8 Professor Gedicks concludes that this secular 
individualist discourse, which has been influenced by twentieth 
century notions of relativism, naturalistic science, and legal re-
alism,9 has utterly failed to provide a satisfactory system of in-
teraction between church and state and, therefore, “should be 
abandoned.”10 
In reaching this conclusion, Professor Gedicks identifies two 
flaws inherent in the secular individualist discourse. First, he 
shows that while secular individualism justifies its exclusion of 
religion from public debate on the distinctly postmodern 
grounds that religion is “subjective,”11 it simultaneously fails to 
recognize its own subjectivity. Professor Gedicks illustrates 
this theoretical flaw through a discussion of the Court’s inabil-
ity, despite its use of the rhetoric of objectivity, to convincingly 
ascribe “inherent meaning” to the neutrality principle in estab-
 
 5. GEDICKS, supra note 1, at 4. 
 6. See id. at 11; see also Frederick Mark Gedicks, The Improbability of Religion 
Clause Theory, 27 SETON HALL L. REV. 1233, 1237 (1997) (noting that “[r]eligious 
communitarianism presumes a society in which church and state are institutionally 
but not politically or culturally separated”). Professor Gedicks argues that something 
like this religious communitarian discourse dominated American politics and law 
through the nineteenth century, resulting in the “de facto establishment” of Protestant 
Christianity as the state religion. See GEDICKS, supra note 1, at 16-17 (citing MARK DE 
WOLFE HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS 11-15 (1965)). 
 7. GEDICKS, supra note 1, at 4. Professor Gedicks makes clear that these com-
peting discourses should not be taken too literally as “an attempted reconstruction of 
the past as it was experienced by those who lived it.” Id. at 24. Instead, they are “ideo-
logical constructions for a contemporary purpose—to reorganize and understand more 
deeply the religion clause jurisprudence of the Supreme Court.” Id. at 23-24. The value 
of this dichotomy, he says, “lies not in [its] historical, but in [its] rhetorical plausibil-
ity.” Id. at 24. 
 8. See id. at 12 (“[P]ublic life is the realm of the objective, secular discourse pro-
tected from the irrationality and subjectivity of faith.”). Professor Gedicks notes else-
where that, on a societal scale, this shift began in earnest early in the twentieth cen-
tury. See id. at 18. Not until Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 855 (1947), did 
the Court “abandon[] religious communitarianism as a normative guide to church-state 
relations, in favor of secular individualism.” Gedicks, supra note 6, at 1241. 
 9. See GEDICKS, supra note 1, at 18. 
10. Id. at 125. 
11. Id. at 30. 
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lishment clause cases.12 Second, Professor Gedicks shows that 
secular individualism will not countenance some policy results 
that both the Court and the American people desire;13 the 
Court’s “deep commitment”14 to the rhetoric of secular indi-
vidualism therefore forces it to manufacture implausible secu-
lar justifications for undeniably religion-friendly outcomes.15 As 
Professor Gedicks puts it, the Court often finds itself “de-
fend[ing] results that are possible only within religious com-
munitarian discourse with arguments that can be made only 
with secular individualist discourse.”16 Gedicks demonstrates 
this practical flaw by examining the contradictory results of 
seemingly similar cases dealing with issues such as parochial 
schools, religious colleges, religious exemptions from generally 
applicable legislation, and religious tax exemptions.17 
Both flaws evidence a certain intellectual dishonesty that 
has generated “ridicule by commentators, and lack of popular 
support” on both sides of the debate.18 Although an analysis of 
each flaw, and its potential relationship with the other, would 
be enlightening, the remainder of this Book Review will focus 
on Professor Gedicks’s theoretical treatment of the first flaw: 
the overconfidence of the secular individualist discourse in its 
own ability to provide absolute meaning in public debate. Part 
II will describe in greater detail Professor Gedicks’s analysis, 
giving particular attention to his attempt to deconstruct the 
subjective/objective dichotomy upon which secular individualist 
discourse relies. Part III will begin by suggesting that an ac-
ceptance of the subtext of Professor Gedicks’s arguments inevi-
 
12. See id. at 25-43. 
13. The depiction by a state actor of religious holiday symbols, such as nativity 
scenes, Christmas trees, and Hanukah menorahs, provides the clearest example. See 
id. at 76-80. 
14. Id. at 76. 
15. See id. at 45. 
16. Id. at 63. For example, in Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984), the Court 
upheld the constitutionality of the depiction of the nativity of Jesus as part of a city-
sponsored Christmas display. According to secular individualist discourse, which does 
not contemplate the overt sponsorship by the state of any religious symbol, the Court 
could not simply recognize the nativity scene as an expression of religious belief. The 
Court avoided the dilemma by concluding that the nativity scene had no real religious 
significance; it was instead a secular recognition of the origin of the Christmas holiday, 
intended to foster a friendly community spirit. See id. at 680; see also GEDICKS, supra 
note 1, at 76-78. As Professor Gedicks notes, such a distinction is “ludicrous.” Id. at 76. 
17. See GEDICKS, supra note 1, at 44-116. 
18. Id. at 3. 
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tably leads to a return to a religion clause jurisprudence in 
which religion is allowed a more prominent role in public de-
bate.19 Part III will then present the possibility that such a dis-
course may exhibit a theoretical flaw similar to that which Ge-
dicks identifies in the secular individualist discourse, and will 
suggest that, if this is the case, all discussion of religion clause 
theory in terms of these competing discourses becomes useless. 
Finally, Part III will suggest that there may indeed be a char-
acteristic of religion-based discourse that recommends it as 
theoretically superior to the secular individualist discourse. Al-
though this conclusion will not completely resolve the subjec-
tive/objective dichotomy from a postmodern viewpoint, it dem-
onstrates that a religion-based discourse avoids the internal 
inconsistency inherent in the secular-based discourse and, 
therefore, is to be theoretically preferred. 
II.  DECONSTRUCTING THE SECULAR INDIVIDUALIST DISCOURSE 
Professor Gedicks begins his discussion of the secular indi-
vidualist discourse’s theoretical flaw by noting that 
“[c]ontemporary philosophers have largely abandoned the clas-
sical account of truth and knowledge under the pressure of 
postmodern arguments that human beings cannot experience 
the world without simultaneously altering it.”20 As a result, 
“[f]acts are not taken to have any essential characteristics or 
meaning;”21 instead, facts only “mean” something by reference 
to the theory or structure that orders them.22 Observers operat-
ing from different theoretical perspectives thus “see (and fail to 
see) certain aspects of the world that seem absent (or present) 
in the experience” of other observers.23 Indeed, for proponents 
of such postmodern models, “objectivity is impossible.”24 
The secular individualist discourse embraces this postmod-
ern model of truth and uses it to discredit religion as a basis for 
decision-making in the public sphere.25 As Professor Gedicks 
 
19. This is despite his claims to the contrary. See supra note 4. 
20. GEDICKS, supra note 1, at 9. 
21. Id. 
22. See id. For a good basic exposition of this postmodern approach to truth in 
the context of literary criticism, see David L. Cowles, Poststructuralism, in THE 
CRITICAL EXPERIENCE 102 (David L. Cowles ed., 1992). 
23. GEDICKS, supra note 1, at 26-27. 
24. Cowles, supra note 22, at 109. 
25. Indeed, as has been mentioned, the discourse displays affinities for other 
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notes, secular individualism proceeds on the assumption that 
“no single set of values can be objectively shown to be better 
than any other set.”26 Therefore, the discourse emphasizes 
“preservation of individual choice through value-neutral proce-
dures, so that individuals remain free to act upon the truths 
they discover in the exercise of their own reason.”27 Reason will 
presumably lead each individual to different value choices; 
thus the secular individualist discourse avoids “impos[ing] a set 
of strong values on society.”28 
According to the secular individualist discourse, only ac-
tions that can be “justified empirically or rationally, by refer-
ence to the observable and explainable phenomena of the exte-
rior world” may be properly employed in public life.29 In 
contrast, the religious communitarian discourse sees nothing 
wrong with employing privately held religious beliefs in public 
decision-making; in fact, religion-based values lie “at the heart 
of community preservation.”30 However, because the secular in-
dividualist discourse views these values as inherently subjec-
tive and unverifiable by any rational method, their considera-
tion in politics and law is per se improper. The secular 
individualist discourse thus “treat[s] . . . religious belief . . . as a 
subjective value preference restricted to private life.”31 
The postmodern model of truth upon which the secular in-
dividualist discourse is founded, however, makes this margin-
alization of religion problematic.32 While adherents to the 
postmodern model recognize that facts have only the subjective 
meaning assigned to them by the theory that orders them, they 
are still called upon to evaluate which theories give the best 
“account[] of the facts they purport to explain.”33 This qualita-
 
relativist theories that have developed during the twentieth century. See supra note 9 
and accompanying text. 
26. GEDICKS, supra note 1, at 30. 
27. Id. at 13. 
28. Id. 
29. Id. at 29. In another formulation of this principle, Professor Gedicks de-
scribes secular individualist discourse as holding that “only if a belief is confirmed by 
widely shared human experience, scientific investigation, or reasoning from premises 
that can be verified by such experience or investigation does it qualify as knowledge 
upon which government legitimately can act.” Id. at 31. 
30. Id. at 13. 
31. Id. at 32. 
32. Professor Gedicks refers to this difficulty as an “antimony.” Id. at 9. 
33. Id. 
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tive evaluation necessarily proceeds “on the basis of some pre-
theoretical meaning these facts are assumed to possess.”34 In 
effect, a theory that embraces the postmodern idea that mean-
ing only occurs by reference to the ordering system risks be-
coming internally inconsistent. By its own admission, it is im-
possible for observers operating from a different theoretical 
perspective to appreciate the truth of the “facts” within the sys-
tem. At the same time, by definition, the acknowledgment of 
the subjectivity of truth should preclude those operating within 
the system from having any absolute faith in the “meaning” the 
system has created. 
By self-confidently pointing to religion’s lack of objectivity 
as the basis for its disqualification from public debate, the secu-
lar individualist discourse partakes of this internal inconsis-
tency. The secular individualist discourse confines “subjective” 
religion to the private sphere, while reserving a place in the 
public sphere for secular knowledge; therefore, it tacitly  
argues, contrary to its postmodern assumption, that secular 
knowledge has inherent, objective meaning. Said another way, 
the secular individualist discourse denies that the boundary 
between “moral” and “immoral” can be absolutely defined by re-
ligion, but then assumes that its own definition of the “bound-
ary between the private world of subjective preference and the 
public world of objective fact is natural, fixed and inevitable.”35 
As Gedicks suggests, “[w]ithout a postulate of inherent mean-
ing,”36 such a conclusion should be suspect. 
Professor Gedicks illustrates this internal inconsistency by 
analyzing the Supreme Court’s unsatisfying Establishment 
Clause policy of “government neutrality” toward religion. The 
policy mandates that, to avoid favoring one subjective value 
system over another, government actors must make decisions 
based on objective secular knowledge alone.37 Within the secu-
lar individualist discourse, which considers religion subjective, 
this approach is plausibly viewed as “neutral.” However, those 
operating from within a religion-based discourse view such a 
policy, with equal plausibility, as “bald . . . religious persecu-
 
34. Id. 
35. Id. at 32. 
36. Id. 
37. See id. at 30 (“The state . . . stay[s] aloof from the pursuit of values in private 
life and act[s] only on the basis of objective facts . . . .”). 
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tion,”38 an improper “privileging of secular knowledge”39 over 
religious belief. The Court’s policy is thus inherently “neutral” 
only if religion is inherently subjective and if those who sub-
scribe to religious beliefs are inherently mistaken.40 Given the 
secular individualist distaste for concepts of inherent meaning, 
the circularity of such an argument is obvious. 
Thus, not only does the secular individualist discourse lack 
objectivity from the perspective of outside observers, its incon-
sistent utilization of postmodern theory to critique religious 
communitarian discourse further damages its theoretical 
credibility. While some postmodern theorists deal with this in-
ternal inconsistency problem by acknowledging and, indeed, 
reveling in it,41 the secular individualist discourse takes itself 
seriously, seemingly oblivious to its own flaw. In so doing, the 
discourse demonstrates not only inconsistency but a troubling 
intellectual dishonesty as well. 
III.  A RETURN TO A RELIGION-BASED DISCOURSE? 
As has been mentioned, Professor Gedicks’s critique of the 
secular individualist discourse does not extend to an overt rec-
ommendation that the Supreme Court return to the “ ‘de facto 
Protestant establishment’ ”42 of the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries. Indeed, Professor Gedicks notes that such a return is 
unlikely, at least in the immediate future, given the confused 
state of current Supreme Court precedent.43 More fundamen-
 
38. Id. at 43. 
39. Id. at 32. 
40. See id. at 43 (“The privatization of religion by secular individualist discourse 
is an act of power that can plausibly be defended as religiously neutral only if religion 
is presented as a ‘naturally’ private activity, excluded from public life like all value 
preferences.”). 
41. Professor David Cowles’s analysis of the theories of Jacques Derrida, a pio-
neer of postmodern literary criticism, demonstrates this approach: 
This kind of paradox occurs everywhere—including in Derrida’s own work, as 
he is the first to recognize . . . with wry humor. Derrida himself emphasizes 
the impossibility of explaining his theories using traditional systems of logic 
and exposition—as I have of necessity tried to do here. Like Derrida, I can 
only explain deconstruction using the very languages and systems it sub-
verts. Though we recognize its paradoxes and inconsistencies, we have no 
other language to work with. 
Cowles, supra note 22, at 114. For Derrida, the internal inconsistency inherent in 
postmodern criticism was best described as “play.” Id. at 111. 
42. GEDICKS, supra note 1, at 16 (citing HOWE, supra note 6, at 11-15). 
43. See id. at 122 (“Religion clause jurisprudence would need radical surgery be-
fore religious communitarian discourse could give an account of it that is any more co-
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tally, he worries that “at least some [consequences of a return 
to religious communitarianism] are undesirable.”44 In the end, 
Gedicks specifically rejects the religious communitarian ap-
proach as he has defined it: “Religious communitarian dis-
course is not a viable alternative to secular individualism.”45 
Despite this disclaimer, the subtext of Professor Gedicks’s 
arguments seems to suggest a predilection for a return to some 
form of religion-sensitive public discourse. For example, Ge-
dicks uses language in his description of the secular individual-
ist discourse that subtly betrays his bias. He describes the 
secularist argument that religion is unfit for public discourse 
as the “marginaliz[ation] of religious belief,”46 and refers to the 
modern prevalence of secularism over religion as an indefensi-
ble “act of power”47 and as “violence.”48 More directly, Gedicks 
notes that “[a]t present, secular individualism and religious 
communitarianism are the only two imaginable alternatives. 
Virtually every proposal of theoretical or doctrinal reform in re-
ligion clause jurisprudence modulates between” these two dis-
courses.49 If this is true, any move away from secular individu-
alist discourse necessarily becomes a move toward religious 
communitarian discourse. Gedicks may indeed disagree with a 
return to a “de facto establishment;” however, given the alter-
natives he presents, his criticism of the secular individualist 
discourse seems at least to suggest a preference for an ap-
proach in which religious values are not completely banished 
from the public square.50 
 
herent than that of secular individualism.”). 
44. Id. at 123. 
45. Id. 
46. Id. at 32. 
47. Id. at 43. 
48. Id. at 4. 
49. Id. at 123. 
50. But see id. at 123 (arguing that, because the discourses are “antithetical” to 
each other, “efforts to mediate a compromise position between the two are doomed”); id. 
at 124 (“Even granting the dubious assumption that a coherent (if unholy) combination 
of [the discourses] is rhetorically possible, championing this amalgamated discourse is 
likely to have little practical effect.”). 
Although a “combination” of religious communitarianism and secular individual-
ism may indeed be theoretically impossible, another option may be to resort to a relig-
ion-based discourse that defines “religious values” on a level of greater generality than 
did the discourse which resulted in the de facto Protestant establishment. Such a dis-
course would need to be crafted to allow consideration of traditional religious morality 
in Establishment Clause cases, while still protecting acts of religious devotion under 
the Free Exercise Clause by members of minority religious groups. Admittedly, such a 
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A return to a religion-based discourse51 would bring with it 
some of the problems of subjectivity that Professor Gedicks 
identifies in his critique of the secular individualist discourse. 
Just as secular individualism looks subjective to outside ob-
servers, religious belief is subjective from a secular point of 
view. If this subjectivity problem alone disqualifies all theories 
from public debate, further theoretical discussion of religious 
clause jurisprudence would be meaningless—according to the 
postmodern model of truth, no discourse can escape this exter-
nal subjectivity.52 It is, of course, improbable that theorists will 
stop talking about theory in the religion clause debate;53 what 
remains is to determine which theory, despite its postmodern 
flaws, supplies the best “account[] of the facts [it] purport[s] to 
explain.”54 
On a purely theoretical level, religion-based discourse 
seems to possess a quality that recommends it as superior to 
secular individualist discourse. By disqualifying religion from 
public debate on the grounds that the “facts” it contributes are 
subjective, secular individualism subscribes to the postmodern 
model, which describes all meaning as bound to the history 
 
discourse would not resolve the subjectivity problem; its outlines would be controver-
sial and would require counter-majoritarian balancing by the Court. 
Further discussion of this possibility is beyond the scope of this Book Review. My 
suggestion here is simply that, although Gedicks’s stated purpose is to describe rather 
than solve the problem, his insightful theoretical analysis seems to readily give way to 
fatalistic resignation. 
51. Because “religious communitarian discourse,” as Gedicks has defined it, im-
plies elements of the de facto Protestant establishment that Gedicks finds objectionable 
from the perspective of minority religious groups, I refer here to a more general relig-
iously informed discourse. 
52. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
53. That would be bad for the law professor business. However, in his most re-
cent article on the subject, this seems to be what Professor Gedicks recommends, at 
least in the context of religious exemptions from generally applicable laws: 
To justify granting an exemption from religiously neutral laws to adversely 
affected religious believers, one needs a theory that explains why religion is a 
uniquely valuable human activity entitled to uniquely strong constitutional 
protection. Such a theory, however, would fly directly in the face of the nor-
mative presuppositions of secular individualism. . . . Theories of special pro-
tection of religion will almost certainly remain voices crying in the wilder-
ness, like parents lamenting that their children do not act like adults. And 
like parents, religion clause theorists might do better to deal with what is, 
rather than searching for what is unlikely ever to be found. 
Gedicks, supra note 6, at 1258. 
54. GEDICKS, supra note 1, at 9. 
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that defines it.55 By recognizing the impossibility of “inherent 
meaning,” secular individualism also makes impossible any ab-
solute faith in its own account of the “facts,” even within the 
discourse itself. In postmodern terms, the secular individualist 
discourse fails to provide itself a “center” upon which meaning 
within the system can be grounded.56 
Religion-based discourse, in contrast, does not acknowledge 
the postmodern idea that truth is relative. Its disagreement 
with secular individualism is not that secularism is subjective, 
but that it is absolutely wrong.57 For the religion-based dis-
course, the “center” which provides absolute meaning within 
the system is God himself. Although access to this center may 
be problematic at times, belief in its existence allows for abso-
lute faith in the truth of “facts” dependent upon such belief. For 
those who believe in God, the account given by religion-based 
discourse of the facts surrounding the church-state debate can 
be intellectually satisfying because, from their perspective, the 
absolute meaning of those facts is not impossible to conceive. 
According to strict postmodern theory,58 even the “center” is 
part of the system it defines.59 The meaning provided by any 
center, although absolute to those operating within the system, 
will still be subjective to those viewing the facts from a differ-
ent theoretical perspective. Thus, from a postmodern point of 
view, the fact that religion-based discourse is centered on the 
absolute wisdom of God does not allow it to escape the subjec-
tivity problem. However, unlike the secular individualist dis-
course, the religion-based discourse’s center allows it to be in-
ternally consistent. And unlike secular individualism, which is 
forced by its own relativism to feign objectivity in order to cre-
ate any meaning, religion-based discourse is theoretically hon-
est. Even if God is dead, secular individualism, by its own ad-
mission, cannot be intrinsically “correct.” At least for religion-
based discourse, the possibility of correctness exists. 
 
55. See supra Part II. 
56. See Cowles, supra note 22, at 106-07. Derrida refers to this concept of the 
“center” as the “transcendental signified.” Id. at 106. 
57. Cf. GEDICKS, supra note 1, at 26 (“Most of those inhabiting the world of one 
church-state discourse . . . understand quite well the world of the other; they simply 
think the other is wrong.”). 
58. “Strict postmodern theory” may be an oxymoron. 
59. See Cowles, supra note 22, at 106 (noting that the impression of inherent 
meaning provided by a center is “an illusion” because “every center actually depends on 
the very system it supposedly grounds”). 
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IV.  CONCLUSION 
Like Professor Gedicks, my purpose here has not been to 
propose a practical “solution” to the inconsistency that has oc-
curred in religion clause jurisprudence. Rather, it has been to 
analyze Professor Gedicks’s theoretical approach and, in keep-
ing with this focus, to explore the theoretical strengths and 
weaknesses of the competing discourses he identifies. I, like 
Professor Gedicks, have concluded that the secular individual-
ist discourse fails to do what it promises: provide an objective, 
neutral answer to church-state issues. Unlike Professor Ge-
dicks, I conclude that a broadly defined religion-based dis-
course is more theoretically satisfying. Although it is unclear 
what practical implications this theoretical discussion of the 
competing discourses may have, as Professor Gedicks notes, it 
is sometimes enough to simply demonstrate a problem in hopes 
that a solution will presently appear.60 
D. Heath Bailey 
 
60. See GEDICKS, supra note 1, at 125. 
